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Resumen- Partiendo de la difundida distinción, entre unos ordenamientos jurídicos 
abiertos, como el derecho inglés y el anglo americano, que se vinculan en el pasado al 
Derecho Romano, y otros cerrados o codificados, como los derechos del continente 
europeo, y tras detenernos en el origen terminológico de ambos sistemas y en su rígida 
contraposición, se procura destacar en este trabajo que Roma y su Derecho tampoco 
abrazan en toda su pureza, un sistema abierto.  
Para su argumentación se sigue una triple vía: 1ª) la propia estructura y contenido de la 
teoría de las “masas” de Bluhme que ofrece datos de interés, 2ª) los digestorum libri [de 
Celso, Juliano, Marcelo y Cervidio Escévola] pues a través de ellos sus autores logran la 
máxima coordinación entre ius civile y del ius honorarium, y 3ª) el análisis de algunos 
fragmentos de esos digestorum, que recogidos en D. 50.17. 
 
 
 
Abstract- Based on the widespread distinction between open legal systems, as English 
and Anglo American law, which were linked in the past to Roman law, and other closed 
or coded systems [rights of the European continent], after pausing at the terminological 
origin of both systems, and their rigid contraposition, in this paper we seek to highlight 
that Rome, and its law neither embrace an open system in all its purity. 
For this purpose we follow three lines of reasoning: 1
st
) the structure and contents of the 
Bluhme’s theory, that provides useful information, 2nd) the digestorum libri [by Celsus, 
Iulianus, Marcelus and Quintus Cervidius Scaevola] through which their authors 
achieve the highest coordination of the ius civile and ius honorarium, 3
rd
) some of the 
fragmentos of those digestorum, formulated in general terms, and contained in D.50, 17 
[de diversis regulis iuris antiqui]. 
 
 
 
 
  (I) 
 
 
1. Today, legal systems are typically classified into two types, whose 
names are owed to SCHULZ and their diffusion to ESSER1. These 
two types of system go beyond the classic controversy between the 
jurisprudence of concepts2 and the jurisprudence of interests3. One 
of these types is the “closed” system of legal regulations. An 
example of this type would be continental European law, in which 
matters are codified and which can be traced back to the axiomatic 
thinking of the “classical” world4 (ARISTOTLE), and which in 
modern times, relates to a systematic manner of thinking 
                                                 
1
 SCHULZ, F., Storia de la giurisprudenza romana, Italian translation by NOCERA, 
G., Firenze, 1968. Original version: History of Roman Legal Science, Oxford, 1946 (ed. 
Anastática, 1953). ESSER, J., Principio y norma en la elaboración jurisprudencial del 
Derecho Privado, spanish translation by VALENTI FIOL, Barcelona, 1961. Cfr. 
criticism by DE CASTRO, ADC, XI, 1, p. 235 ff. and 283 ff. Original version, 
Grundsatz und Norm, Untersuchungen zur Vergleichenden Allgemeinen Rechtslehre 
und zur Methodik der Rechtsvergleichung, 1956.     
2
 GARCÍA DE ENTERRÍA, E, in his prologue to VIEHWEG, T., Tópica y 
Jurisprudencia, Madrid, 1964, p. 12, n. 5 (the Spanish version of Topik und 
Jurisprudenz, Munich, 1963) states that WIEACKER (cfr. full bibliographic reference 
ibid) spoke fairly of “the boring controversy surrounding the so-called jurisprudence of 
concepts”. 
3
 SEIDL takes us on a tour of Roman sources related to the difference between the 
jurisprudence of concepts and the jurisprudence of interests in his succinct and brilliant 
work, criticised by KASER, M., En torno al método de los juristas romanos, translation 
by MIQUEL, J., Valladolid, 1964, pp. 32 to 34, and specifically in his very extensive n. 
74. 
4
 KASER. En torno al método cit., pp. 10 in fine and 11, specifies that axiomatic 
thought derives from a series of fundamental rules and concepts which, as axioms 
(hence the name), do not need to be proven. From these rules and concepts, by using 
logical deduction, all of their maxims and concepts can be derived. These will not be 
capable of contradicting one another or be derived or deduced from others, or from the 
system. KASER concludes that only this type of legal system can be considered a 
“system” in the Aristotelian sense.  
(HARTMANN)5. The other type of legal system is the “open” 
system, which involves a series of solutions to legal problems 
(today, the case law method)6. Examples include English and 
Anglo7-American8 law, in which matters are not codified and which 
can be traced back to the classical world and ius Romanum9 and 
problem-focused or topical thinking (CICERO)10, and in modern 
times is related to aporetic thinking (HARTMANN)11. 
 
 
2. Following this minimal doctrinal reminder, a warning should be 
given that some legal systems today, depending on the argumenta 
formulated a repugnantibus (to use CICERO’s terminology)12 as 
salient aspects, are not produced “in all their purity”, to paraphrase 
                                                 
5
 NICOLAI HARTMANN’s category is reminiscent of GARCÍA DE ENTERRÍA in the 
prologue to VIEHWEG, Tópica y Jurisprudencia cit., p. 13 and it is VIEHWEG 
himself, op. cit., p. 51, who summarises HARTMANN’s counterproposition between 
systematic-thinking and problem-focused thinking starting from the problem and 
bearing in mind that if emphasis is placed on establishing a system, the system operates 
on a selection of problems; if focus is placed on the problems, then a system is sought 
that will help in finding the solution. 
6
 A problem is understood to mean any matter that apparently has more than one 
solution. 
7
 Especially Australia and New Zealand. 
8
 That is, the United States of America (except Louisiana) and Canada (except Quebec). 
9
 Cfr. for all, to be used as a type of manual, differences between the Roman 
jurisprudential system and current open (legal) systems in GARCÍA GARRIDO M.J., 
Derecho Privado Romano, Madrid, 1991, pp. 117-120. 
10
 KASER, En torno al método cit., p. 12 if and 13 pr. reminds us that topical thinking 
does not start from within the system as a whole, from which the applicable rule to 
resolve the case can be retrieved by deduction. Instead, it starts within the case itself and 
involves searching for the premises that will allow the case to be resolved and 
attempting to produce general guidelines and guiding concepts that will allow the 
solution to be induced. These guiding concepts are topoi, while topics consist of “the art 
of finding these topoi”.  
11
 VIEHWEG, Tópica y Jurisprudencia cit., p. 52, summarises the counterproposition in 
this way: Systematic thinking stems from the whole; aporetic thinking works the other 
way around. 
12
 CICERO, Top. III, 21. 
KASER13. On the contrary, it is communis opinio that the traditional 
distinction between “open” and codified or “closed” legal systems 
has become blurred, due to an inversion of the factors on which they 
operate. Therefore, without attempting to be exhaustive, it is fitting 
to present both critical observations, a contrario, and distinctive 
criteria that have been pointed out regarding certain legal systems. 
Taking the signifier/signified relationship as a basis, these points 
will make it possible to combat the dogmatism and rigidity of those 
salient aspects and, at the same time, support, not only our latest 
general statement that today the differences discussed here have 
become blurred, but also that their portrayal is, at the very least, 
questionable. 
 
 
3. As anticipated, our observations will relate to: matters of law; the 
axiomatic and the problematic; the value or values of the Topics; and 
the systematic and the aporetic. 1) It is important to remember that 
although matters of law are codified in closed systems, they are 
interpreted, supplemented and reworked within the categories and 
means of casuistic law. Meanwhile in open systems, although 
matters of law are not codified, statute law includes important 
components of regulatory law.14 2) Regarding the opposition 
between problem-focused15 (topical)16 thinking and deductive 
                                                 
13
 KASER, En torno al método cit., p.10. 
14
 Cfr. for all, KASER, En torno al método cit., p.10. 
15
 KASER, (following VIEHWEG), En torno al método, cit., p. 14, summarises that the 
topical searches for premises that are not susceptible to deduction, while logic, on the 
other hand, syllogises to create premises. Reminds us that anyone who uses topics to 
deal with a problem (hence, for some such as VIEHWEG, the terminological 
(axiomatic) thinking we must point out that in the majority of cases 
this opposition is misguided, since the concepts belong to different 
areas of logic (they are not conflicting and are certainly not 
incompatible) and they operate at different times within the rational 
process.17 In other words, further to playing a first analytical role, 
topics can play a second synthetic one18, through which a system 
can be constructed.19 3) At least two components should be 
mentioned in relation to the value (or values) of the word topics: 
classical sources and current doctrine. In classical sources, while 
Topics is univocal as the signifier, it is equivocal as the signified20. 
                                                                                                                                               
comparison between the problematic and the topical) cannot reject deductive thinking. 
This is because although the initial premises are induced, their application to the 
specific case is achieved using logical deduction. 
16
 Topics has a role that, in the language established by VIEHWEG, Tópica y 
jurisprudencia cit., is problematic; hence the terminological comparison alluded to in 
the previous note. 
17
 GUZMÁN, Historia de la interpretación de las normas en Derecho Romano, 
Santiago de Chile, 2000, p. 311, who I follow, criticises VIEHWEG’s 
counterproposition. GUZMÁN tells us that what VIEHWEG is really trying to do, is to 
differentiate between codified and uncodified legal systems.  
18
 GUZMÁN, Historia de la interpretración cit. p. 312, calls this second role 
systematic. 
19
 VIEHWEG, Topica y jurisprudencia cit., p. 34, explains this in the following way: 
ARISTOTLE distinguishes between that which is apodictic, field of truth, attributable to 
philosophers; and that which is dialectic, field of opinion, which corresponds to 
rhetoricians and sophists. Topics comprise the art of argument and belong to dialectical 
rather than apodictic terrain; topoi are dialectical and rhetorical conclusions. CICERO 
does not allude to this distinction. Invention = discovery (ars inveniendi) art of 
discovering arguments, and the formation of judgement (ars iudicandi), are the essential 
parts of the dissertation, where he called the first topics and the second, dialectic.  
20
 Thus, with the title Topics, ARISTOTLE composed a philosophical book: he 
formulates a theory of the dialectic as a rhetoric art and is primarily interested in causes. 
CICERO, on the other hand, with the same title, produces a prescriptive tool; he centres 
on the practice of argumentation; he attempts to apply a specific catalogue of topics and 
is interested in the results. Cfr. VIEHWEG, Tópica y jurisprudencia cit., pp. 43-45 and 
in general, ch. II, La Tópica aristotélica y la Tópica ciceroniana pp. 32 ff. ARISTOTLE 
distinguishes between that which is apodictic, field of truth, attributable to philosophers 
and that which is dialectic, field of opinion, which corresponds to rhetoricians and 
sophists. Topics = the art of argument, and belongs to dialectical rather than apodictic 
terrain. Therefore, topoi are dialectical and rhetorical conclusions. CICERO does not 
Today, the Aristotelian signifier of Topics still exists (=formulation of 
a “theory” of the dialectic), but for contemporary jurists, its meaning 
is Ciceronian and is centred on the “practice” of argumentation. 
Also, remember that in modern doctrine a distinction is made by 
VIEHWEG, between a first-degree and second-degree topic21, the 
latter of which consists of applying a simple repertoire of previously 
produced points of view or catalogues of topics.22 4) Regarding the 
systematic and the aporetic, prudence would counsel us to avoid 
identifying the term “system” with “axiom”, which has the reverse 
effect of making that which is systematic and that which is topical 
irreconcilable (when this is not the case). Certainly, system-thinking 
comes from the whole, while in aporetic thinking the reverse occurs. 
However, it is no less certain that the two functions are compatible. 
What they reveal is that if emphasis is put on the “system”, this 
system will be established by selecting problems, whereas if 
emphasis is placed on the “problem”, then it will be necessary to 
search for a system to find the solution.23 
                                                                                                                                               
allude to this distinction. Invention = discovery (ars inveniendi), the art of discovering 
arguments, and the formation of judgement (ars iudicandi) are the essential parts of the 
dissertation, in which he called the first topics and the second, dialectic.  
21
 VIEHWEG, Tópica y jurisprudencia cit, pp. 52, 53 and 77, summarises by saying 
that the first-degree topics originate in the case itself, involve searching for the premises 
that might serve to resolve the case and then attempting to produce general guidelines or 
guiding concepts that allow a decision to be induced. This observation shows that in 
daily life, this is almost always the usual way to proceed. KASER, Método de los 
juristas, cit, pp. 12 and 13, completes this note in his summary that: the guiding 
concepts are topoi, while topics are the art of discovering them. 
22
 A catalogue of topics, under the title de regulae iuris antiquae, is supplied by 
D.50.17. 
23
 GUZMÁN, Historia de la interpretación cit., pp. 312, defends this compatibility and 
actually calls the second function (see our n. 21) systematic. For the connections, in 
synthesis, between problem-focused and systematic thinking as explained by 
HARTMANN, cfr. VIEHWEG Tópica y jurisprudencia cit., pp. 50-52. Complete 
bibliographic references to HARTMANN, ibi, p. 49, n. 24, without forgetting our notes 
  
 
4. According to TORRENT24, it is frequently stated that common law 
recognises case law as a primary source of law, and that therein lies 
its major difference from civil law, which only recognises enacted 
law or statute as a formal source of law. However, he also 
emphasises, and in this he coincides with CANNATA, the 
undeniable fact that case law precedents carry extreme importance 
and authority in continental European systems as well. So much so 
that, in many fields, it is not the law that is “known”, but rather it is 
the related case law that is “known”.25  
 
 
5. As the purpose of this work is to formulate some observations 
abut the metohodological criteria of counterpropositions, we shall 
now move on to focus on  argumentum a repugnantibus and 
digestorum libri. It is our intention that considering this type of legal 
literature more closely may be fruitful and form a basis for 
argument, since in ius Romanum itself (represented by these digesta) 
radicalisms and extreme opposition can be avoided, and it may be 
                                                                                                                                               
19 and 21. Remember the obvious: a problem is any matter that apparently allows more 
than one response and for which it is necessary to find one single response as a solution, 
which leads to the problem becoming incorporated into a system.   
24
 TORRENT, A. Fundamentos del Derecho Europeo, Ciencia del Derecho: derecho 
romano-ius commune-derecho europeo, Madrid, 2007, pp. 248-260; 343-345.  
25
 Cfr. for everyone, CANNATA, CA, Historia de la ciencia cit. ch. XIV: I) Dos 
tradiciones jurídicas II) Case law y dogmatic, pp 238-242.  
an iter to invoke in support of an intermediary route or, at least, a 
less extreme position.  
 
 
(II) 
 
 
The Libri digestorum (or Digesta) are authentic treatises on ius 
privatum, which follow the expository order of the Edictum 
Pretorium.26 They came into being as a genre of legal literature27 in its 
pre-classical phase with the veteres and, specifically, in the circle of 
the Servi auditores28. It is no coincidence that SERVIUS SULPICIUS 
                                                 
26
 CANNATA, Historia cit., p. 77. 
27
 GUARINO, A., L´esegesi delle fonti del diritto romano, I, pp. 169-178, Napoli, 1968, 
systematises le forme della letteratura giuridica classica and distinguishes between: A) 
commentaries: a) whether on civil or praetorian law, such as the iuris civilis libri or the 
ad edictum respectively; b) whether texts of the ius publicum; c) or works by preceding 
jurists such as notes and observations, with different titles (ad ex.: the libri ad and the 
name of the iurisprudens treatise; libri ex and the name of the author and work on 
which he wrote the commentary, or, finally, as notae ad…or epitomae); B) casuistic 
works proprio sensu, or rather, collection of casus or problemata, with their solutions, 
such as the libri: a) responsorum; b) quaestionum, disputationum and epistularum and 
c) the digestorum, basically collections of quaestiones and responsa, very extensive, in 
such as way as to contemplate all private law in force. C) monographic works: a) either 
of a special nature, such as the libri dedicated to the ius fisci or to the res militaris; b) or 
of specific practical importance, such as the libri de iudicis publicis; on exercising an 
officio of a public nature: such as those de officio consulis, proconsulis, praesidis, 
praefecti.. or in matters of cognitio extra ordinem; and c) on private law, such as 
manumisiones, nuptiae; verborum obligationes; testamenta; fideicommissa…; and D) 
elementary didactic works in their two forms: a) systematic manuals b) elementary 
chrestomathy, such as the collections of: regulae, definitiones, sententiae, opiniones, 
differentiae.   
28
 With his Ad Brutum libri II (work from which there are only a few references) 
Serviuscommences the ad Praetoris Edictum commentaries. Thus, Pomponius in D. 
1.2.44 Lib. Sing. Enchr. tells us: Servius duos libros ad Brutum perquam brevísimos ad 
edictum suscriptos reliquit and Cic. de leg 1.5.17: non ergo, a praetoris edicto, ut 
plerique nunc… hauriendum iuris disciplinam putas (plerique means the many 
followers of Servius, of whom Pomponiuscites 10 in the aforementioned Digest text).   
RUFUS, considered to be the leading jurist at the end of the 
Republic (along with QUINTUS MUCIUS SCAEVOLA29), in 
addition to being a prolific teacher30, was the first to bring scientific 
activity into the field of ius honorarium, whose productive source is 
the Praetor’s Edict itself. His follower ALFENUS VARUS was the 
first to write a work of this name: Digesta, a signifier, which 
importantly, comes from the verb digerere = to order, and therefore 
means order. This idea is anticipated in its title and it ends by 
reflecting through its successive proponents, better than any other 
type of work within the legal literature (with the logical exception of 
the libri institutionum), the systematic tendency of the classical 
jurists. The contents of ALFENUS’ digestorum libri were, in essence, 
his own responsa and, above all, those of his maestro, which 
probably does not prevent31 them from having the nature of private 
law treatises, as stated in their definition.32 It is normally maintained 
                                                 
29
 In a way they apply the same scientific method. Thus, according to Pomponius, D. 
1.2.2.41 Lib. Sing. Enchr. while Quintus Mucius Scaevola was the first to systematise 
the ius civile, this activity was continued by Servius Sulpicius Rufus in the ius 
honorarium. Cfr. above note. 
30
 Creator of the Servian school (auditores Servii) as mentioned in D. 1.2.44. 
31
 CANNATA, Historia cit., p. 77. 
32
 Cfr. LENEL, O., Palingenesia Iuris Civilis. I, Lipsiae, 1889, pp. 37-54. That of the 
digestorum libri XL, such as genuinum Alfeni opus, (Alfeni digesta), for which we only 
have numeric references to three of his books: I (D. 28.1.25 Iav. 5 post Lab), XXXIV 
(Gell. N. Att. 7.5.1), and XXXIX (D. 3.5.20.pr Paul. 9 ad Ed.); That for which 
indirectly, and anonymously (Alfeni Digesta ab anonymo epitomata libri VII) we have 
references to five works (to II, IV, V, VI and VII); through Paulus’ epitome (Digesta a 
Paulo epitomata vel Paulus epitomarum Alfeni libri VIII) to seven (from I to VI and 
VIII); and where, finally, there are 16 fragments of the Digest where Alfenus laudatur 
non indicato libro, to paraphrase LENEL. It is risky to dogmatise regarding the specific 
and precise order (or systematic structure) and the possible (or probable) analogies to 
and/or differences from the one adopted, in classical times by: Celsus, Julianus, 
Marcellus and Cervidius Scaevola. GUARINO, L´Esegesi cit., p. 142, only “assumes” 
the order of the material contained in the Praetor’s Edict in the work of Alfenus, and on 
p. 143 he sheds doubt as to the classical nature of the sources (epitome and copy) used 
by the compilers of the Digest. TORRENT, Diccionario de Derecho Romano, Madrid, 
that in classical times the digesta changed the actual order of the ius 
civile33, which was followed by their first proponent, and that they 
were structured in two parts. The first part was produced with 
reference to the ius honorarium, or rather, in accordance with the 
concepts of the Praetor’s Edict34. The second belongs to ius civile, and 
                                                                                                                                               
2005, p. 100 (Alfenus Varus) considers the order of the Edict to be “likely”. 
CANNATA, Historia, cit., p. 55 states that it is, still, a collection of responsa, but 
sufficiently rich and coordinated to be classified as a “treatise of private law”. On p. 77 
and in n. 157 he distinguishes between the structure of Alfenus’ digesta and that of the 
four classical jurists. He maintains that Alfenus’ digest would follow the order of the ius 
civile, and on p. 56 claims that this can even be proven. We agree with CANNATA on 
these issues, in that it is necessary to continue bringing up the observations of 
SCHERILLO, G., “Il sistema civilistico”, in Studi Arangio Ruiz, IV (1953), pp. 445 - 
467.  
33
 The matters with which it dealt followed a practical order, and were centred on four 
fundamental aspects of the ius civile: testamentum (which allows us to speak of ab 
intestato succession); mancipatio (which makes it possible to deal with sale and 
purchase, and easement); in iure cessio (which leads to dealings related to society); and 
finally, stipulatio (with the many practical applications that it makes possible). 
CANNATA, Historia cit., p. 56, tells us that it relates to the traditional order of the old 
collections of commonly known formulae and that it allowed the work to be consulted 
at ease; it was the order of the collections of responsa themselves and, in one case, 
Alfenus’ Digesta, it can even be proven. Following SCHERILLO, CANNATA notes 
that while the order of the different works may present certain peculiarities, the general 
structure and the idea being governed is invariable. In more detail, Mucianus’ order of 
matters was: I) Inheritance (testamentary succession, heredis institutio, exheredatio, 
acceptance and renouncement, legacies and ab intestato succession); II) Persons 
(matrimony, guardianship; statuliber; patria potestas; potestas dominica, freemen and 
as an appendix: procurator and negotiorum gestor); III) Things (Possessio and 
usucapio, non usus and usucapio libertatis); and IV) Obligations: Contracts, (mutuum, 
commodatum, locatio conductio, appendix to easements, and societas) and Crimes 
(iniuriae, furtum, damnum iniuria dato ex lege Aquilia). Cfr. LENEL, Palingenesia cit., 
II, p. 1256, which gives detailed information about Ad Sabinum librorum rubricarum 
index. KASER, En torno al método cit., pp. 39 to 42, carries out work on synthesis: The 
only thing that is shown regarding expository order is that closely-related matters were 
united. There is still a method of thinking that acts on the association coming from 
empiricism, and like in argumentation, in the majority of cases we see the genesis of 
systematic construction. It begins to deal with matters with an object that forms the 
centre of interest, and then it goes from one matter to another, via external, analogous 
and different relationships. 
34
 The Edictal System was classified by MOMMSEN as “more than order from 
disorder” the Perpetual Edict, according to LENEL’s Palingenesia cit., II, pp. 1247-
1255, includes four large groups of matters: 1) (titles I-XIII, inclusive, de litis exhordio) 
included the general principles of iurisdictio and the special principles of the municipal 
magistrates, the establishment of judgement (de edendo), citation (in ius vocando) 
deals with de legibus, senatusconsultis et constitutionibus pincipum35. 
Regarding its legal nature, the digestorum libri, should not be 
categorised as problem-focused literature, even though they are 
casuistic. Certainly, the digesta are composed of responsa (with 
ALFENUS VARUS)36 and the libri quaestionum, responsorum, 
disputationum similiumque contain the appendix (pars posterior), 
which covers laws, senatus consulta and, sometimes, imperial 
                                                                                                                                               
capacity and authentication of the parties (de postulando), representation, (de 
cognitoribus et procuratoribus et defensoribus), procedural guarantees (de vadimoniis), 
supplementary remedies of the iurisdictio (pacta conventa, receptum arbitrii, 
compromissum), cases of concession of in integrum restiututio, finishing with the 
rubrics de receptis and de satisdando. 2) (titles XIV-XXIV) the most extensive includes 
everything relating to the problems of ordinary procedure (de iudiciis omnibus) and, in 
essence, it coincided with the matters dealt with in the civilist works, accompanied by 
the modifications agreed by the praetor. It discusses, in detail, cases where the praetor 
grants action (iudicium dabo) although the expository order does not respond to logical 
criteria and the grouping of matters seems to be more circumstantial, according to 
TORRENT, Diccionario cit., pp. 1215-1216. It is centred on the sphere of obligation 
(de rebus creditis; of the actiones that tradition has called adiecticiae qualitatis; de 
bonae fidei contractus) in matters relating to the family (de re uxoria; de liberis et de 
ventre; de tutelis and de iure patronato) and to crime (de furtis). 3) (titles XXV-XXXV) 
mainly contain institutions of praetorian creation, especially bonorum possessio 
(completed in the sphere of succession in relation to de testamentis; de legatis and de 
liberali causa) and to a lesser extent, of tenement actions; de publicanis; de 
praediatoribus and de iniuriis, among others. 4) (titles XXXVI-XLII: de extremis 
iurisdictionis) allude to the execution and efficacy of sententiae of the iudex ptivatus; re 
iudicata, execution procedures and arrangement with creditors. An appendix or 5th and 
final part (titles XLIII-XLV) deals with: interdicta, exceptiones and stipulationes 
praetoriae. KASER, En torno al método cit., pp. 42 and 43, tells us that: it is 
characterised by its flexible procedural guidelines and the total lack of a private law 
system; its purpose is not to produce and ordered system and it uses discursive thinking 
to deal with problems; it shows the disdain that he felt for the dialectic method.     
35
 These would be their specific references according to LENEL, Palingenesia cit., II, p. 
1255: Ad leg. XII T: de hereditate legitima; Ad leg. Cinciam: de donationibus; Ad leg. 
Falcidiam; Ad leg. Corneliam: de captivis et postliminium; Ad leg. Aeliam Sentiam; De 
adoptionibus (?); Ad leg. Iuliam et Papiam ; De publicis iudiciis; Ad leg. Aquiliam; Ad 
leg. Rhodiam; Ad leges de adpromissoribus latas.  
36
 Offering the solution to a real or theoretic case, proposed to the jurist or that he poses 
himself, always with a dogmatic or didactic purpose in consultation with his own 
followers. 
constitutions.37 In some ways they are similar, however the responsa 
are their only material, since casuistic rules, arguments and 
reflections also appear along with quaestiones (or disputations)38. In 
substance, the libri digestorum were something more than a casuistic 
collection, because they contemplated all possible arguments within 
private legal knowledge. They are more like the libri ad edictum, with 
the difference that they are not based on each discourse unit of the 
iuris prudens, dealing extensively with the cases to which they can 
refer. In other words, they deal with the legal “institution” that 
corresponds to the different points of the edict in question or of 
other sources that they consider.39 Within legal literature, and 
starting from the distinction between the different degrees of 
                                                 
37
 CANNATA, Historia cit., pp. 75-77 and n. 133 and 158. This appendix in the digesta 
is very important and its proportion in regard to the libri, ordered in accordance with the 
Edict, is of special note. Thus: 27/12, for the XXXIX digesta of Celsus; 58/32 for the 
XC of Julianus; 21/10, for the XXXI of Marcellus and 21/19 for the XL of Cervidius 
Scaevola. From the Indices of LENEL, Palingenesia cit., II, p.1255, under the title IV 
Digestorum, questionum, responsorum, sententiarum similiumque librorum rubricarum 
index, and in regards to the pars posterior: ad leges, senatusconsulta constituciones 
principum, what is referred to in the text is clear. The inclusion (as an appendix) in 
these works of comments on the sources of ius civile. These are especially evident in the 
following cases: Regarding the responsorum libri XIX of Papinianus from 12 
(proportion: 11/8) and the responsorum libri XIX of Modestinus from 14 (13/6). 
Regarding the quaestionium libri XX of Cervidius Scaevola from 15 (14/6); the 
quaestionium libri XXXVII of Papinianus from 29 (28/9), the quaestionum libri XXVI 
of Paulus, from 17 to 25, (16/9) C) Regarding the disputationium libri X of Ulpian from 
8 (7/3). 
38
 Although the notion of responsum (response from the jurist to the client in a real case 
posed by him) differs from quaestio (questions from the followers to the maestro when 
faced with nuances or variants of the case, whether posed, suggested or formulated by 
them as hypotheses, after the client has left), the same is not true of libri responsorum 
or quaestionum in which responsa and quaestiones are thoroughly mixed. According to 
CANNATA’s statement, Historia cit., pp. 76 and 77, this makes it fitting to extend them 
to include the libri epistolarum and a long etcetera, and which, he reminds us, is the 
motivation for SCHULZ’s fair and generic classification of all of these models as 
problem literature.       
39
 To paraphrase CANNATA, Historia cit., p. 78, a text like this, a thematic 
commentary, or a vision clearly based on ius honorarium, is contrasted with another 
that has more relation to ius civile or that deals with matters that fall under ius civile. 
abstraction achieved by its different types, the responsorum libri 
would represent the lowest level, while the digestorum libri, together 
with the ad edicta, the highest level, with the difference that in the 
latter (ad edictum) the main focus is the study of the ius honorarium 
(legal actions and means) while in the former (digesta) the main 
focus is the ius civile (or rather, its institutions included in leges and 
senatusconsulta).40 No Severian jurist had the necessary talent or 
courage to face the complexity that this type of work represents, 
limiting their authorship, splendour and decline to the iurisprudentes 
of the second century. See: IUVENTIUS CELSUS filius41, SALVIUS 
                                                 
40
 Vid. for all, regarding concepts, analogies and differences within this casuistic 
literature, TORRENT, Diccionario cit., pp. 319, 642 and 643. 
41
 The digesta of P. Iuventius Celsus… filius (Celsi digestorum), cover: the first part 
(pars prior) is related to ius honorarium and contains commentaries on the edict (ad 
edictum) in a total of 27 books (lib. 1-27). The second part (altera) contains the 
remaining books (lib. 28-39) with comments on the ius civile and, specifically, on the 
laws and senatus consulta (ad leges senatusque consulta pertinet) that come from it. 
Cfr. LENEL, Palingenesia cit., I, pp. 127-171. 
IULIANUS42, ULPIUS MARCELLUS43 and QUINTUS CERVIDIUS 
SCAEVOLA44.  
 
 
The most recent digestarum libri are the 40 by SCAEVOLA and the 
best-known are the 39 by CELSUS (perhaps not used by Justinian to 
the extent that they deserved)45, and the 90 by IULIANUS (one of 
the greatest contributions to Roman legal literature), widely 
represented in Justinian’s Digest, the compiler of which especially 
admired this jurist and titled the part of his compilation referring to 
the iura in his honour.  
 
                                                 
42
 The digesta of Salvius Julianus (Iuliani digesta) with a total of 90 books, cum notis of 
Mauricianus, Marcellus, Cervidius Scaevola and Paulus, are from Adrianus and 
Antoninus Pius times, 117-138 (conscripta sunt sub Hadriano et Antonino Pio) and are 
divided into two parts (Sunt autem divisa in duas partes). The first covers up to book 
LVIII and deals with ius honorarium and follows the order of the Edict (quarum prior 
(lib. I-LVIII), edicti sequitur ordine), the final draft of which is fixed (being able to 
state, based on its Edictum Perpetuum, ex Edicto Perpetuo a Iuliano composito). The 
second part (posterior (lib. LIX-XC)) deals with ius civile and the laws and senatus 
consulta on which it is based (ad leges pertinet senatusque consulta). Cfr. LENEL, 
Palingenesia cit., I, pp. 318-483.   
43
 The digesta of Ulpius Marcellus, with notes by Cervidius Scaevola and Ulpianus, are 
from the times of Antoninus Pius and the Divi Fratres, 161-169 (Marcelli digesta 
conscripta videntur M Aurelio et Lucio Vero imperantibus). Their first part (parte 
priore) covers the first 21 books of the 31 of which they consist, and deal with the 
Edict, source of ius honorarium (Ad edictum pertinent libri I-XXI (parte priore)). Their 
final part consists of the ten following books and deals with other sources of the ius 
civile in which the imperial constitutions now appear (ad leges senatusconsulta 
constitutiones, libro XXXI (parte posteriore) sqq.). Cfr. LENEL, Palingenesia, cit., I, 
pp. 318- 589-631). 
44
 The digestorunm libri XL of Q. Cervidius Scaevola, are probably the most recent (sub 
Marco et Vero, Commodo, Septimio Severo.impp 193-211). They follow (ius 
honorarium) the order of the Perpetual Edict in their first 29 books (Edicti perpetui 
ordinem sequuntur libri I-XXIX). The others deal with ius civile and contemplate laws 
and senatus consulta (reliquos libros omnes ad leges senatusque consulta spectasse 
suspicari licet). Cfr. LENEL, Palingenesia, cit., pp. 215-270.           
45
 LATORRE, A. Iniciación a la lectura del Digesto, Barcelona 1978, p. 35. 
  
(III)  
 
 
A final note in way of a practical example ends our thoughts on the 
digestorum libri and its nature as intermediary legal literature 
between our continental European legal regulations and the 
complex of solutions represented by “case law”, represented by 
English and Anglo-American law. In pre-classical and classical law, 
the case is made known in iurisprudens through the narration of the 
person who poses it (in modern-day terms, this would be the client). 
This presentation is normally rich in details, which are frequently 
trivial, and it is nothing but a translation of something that occurred 
in real life. Based on this, the next thing that iurisprudens will do is 
select and synthesise. That is to say, “isolate”46 only the important 
elements of the story from a legal perspective and coordinate them, 
in order to arrive at a statement of the facts composed solely of the 
data that influence the decision. In other words, this isolation is the 
legally correct statement of an event, Sachverhalt, and the basis of its 
fair resolution. Therefore, on reducing a case (species facti) to its 
legally relevant elements, it loses its specific character (its 
individuality) and becomes an outline that can be applicable to 
other cases (facti) that share the same characteristics (species). This 
                                                 
46
  Cfr. SCHULZ, Principios del Derecho Romano, 2ª Ed. Translation by MA 
VELASCO, Madrid, 2000, pp. 39-59. 
process, which can be continued indefinitely47, is called Tatbestand 
by German Romanists. Thus, the responsum do not only propose a 
solution to a specific case, but rather to a situation that has been 
reduced to a type of case that arises from a typical situation.48 
Furthermore, it would be fitting to introduce an intermediary step 
between the specific case and the typical case49, which would come 
to represent a generic case, guide or case type: Vertatbestandlichung 
des Sachverhaltes. 
 
 
Moving from theory to practice we shall now pause to look at an 
example regarding the manner in which a case is stated and in order 
to do this, we shall use the first proponent of the digestorum libri.50 In 
D. 9.2.52 pr (II Digest), ALFENUS poses the scenario of a slave who 
has been injured by a third party and dies as a consequence of the 
injuries (Si ex plagis servus mortuus esset). The problem consists of 
clarifying the cause and effect relationship between the illicit act that 
                                                 
47
 SCHULZ, Principios cit., p. 61-62, after reminding us that “in the beginning there 
was the case”, gives the following example: the vendor of a horse has to compensate the 
purchaser for the damage arising from a delay, and signals the following possible steps 
tending towards the abstract: 1) the vendor of a horse has to compensate the purchaser 
for the damage arising from the delay; 2) the vendor of an animal… id …; 3) the vendor 
of a thing… id…;4) the debtor has to compensate the creditor… id…; 5) the debtor has 
to compensate the creditor for the damage arising from the violation of his credit right.    
48
 Cfr. for all GARCÍA GARRIDO, from that now far away 1965, in his Casuismo y 
Jurisprudencia Romana, Pleitos famosos del Digesto, occupies himself with Roman 
jurisprudence and the casuistic elaboration of law, above all, for his clarity and 
synthesis: Derecho Privado Romano cit., La técnica de elaboración casuística, pp. 90-
94. 
49
 To use the German terminology: Sachverhalt and Tatbestand, CANNATA, Historia 
cit., pp. 53 and 63. 
50
 Cfr. VIEHWEG, Tópica y Jurisprudencia cit., ch. IV La Tópica y el Ius Civile, pp. 67 
to 83, in general and 67 to 70 in particular, for some texts of Julianus’ Digests coming 
from D. 41.3.33.  
has been committed (his death) and the damage initially caused (the 
injuries), and of a possible interruption to the customary causality. 
Or rather, if the perpetrator can be accused of a capital crime or 
whether a claim can be made in accordance with lex Aquilia, which, 
as GAIUS reminds us in 3.213, concedes to the person whose slave 
has died (Cuius autem servus occissus est) the freedom to choose (is 
arbitrium habet) between accusing the person who killed him of a 
capital crime (vel capitale crimine rerum facere) or claiming 
compensation for the damage in accordance with this law (vel hac 
lege damnum persequi). In other words and in procedural terms, it is 
asked whether the dominus, which was damaged in any event, can 
be covered by Caput Primum of the lex Aquilia de damno iniuria dato 
(286 AC), which penalised the unjust death of the slave, in which 
case the reus could be condemned to paying the owner (tantum 
domino dare damnetur) the maximum value of the slave during that 
year (quanti ea res in eo anno plurimi fuit), (Gaius 3,210), or if he could 
only invoke Caput Tertium, which refers (not to the death, but to the 
injuries, iniuriae) to all other classes of damage (de omni cetero damno 
cavetur)51, with the sentence, in such a case, for the person who 
caused the damage, being the maximum value of the damaged 
object during that month (Hoc tamen capite non quanti in eo anno, sed 
quanti in diebus XXX proximis ea res fuerit damnatur is qui damnum 
dederit) (Gaius 3.212).  
 
 
                                                 
51
 Gaius 3.217 states that damage is understood in the broadest sense of destruction.  
ALFENUS responds that the third party understands that the slave 
had been killed, which means that he died due to the injuries that 
were provoked, provided that the death did not come about 
(accidisset) as a result of medical incompetence (medici inscientia) or 
the owner’s negligence (domini negligentia), which is equivalent to 
not consulting a doctor. If these two circumstances have not 
occurred, the owner can: recte de iniuria occiso eo agitur. In short, this 
is a problem in the relationship between cause (injuries) and effect 
(death). Thus, according to the jurist it must be established whether 
the following causality exists: plagae + dominus diligens + medicus 
sciens + mors = (which will lead to) actio de mortuo eo; or whether, on 
the contrary, this nexus does not exist: plagae + dominus negligens + 
medicus insciens + mors = (which will lead to) the actio iniuriarum.  
 
 
A second example from ALFENUS can be found in the same book 
and Digest title (9.2.52.4), Alfenus libro secundo digestorum, in which 
he refers to the following case: A group was playing with a ball 
(Cum pila complures luderent) and one of them ran into (impulit) a 
young slave (quidam ex his servulum) trying to get the ball (cum pilam 
percipere conaretur, impulit). The slave fell over and broke his leg 
(servus cecidit et crus fregit). The question was (quaerebatur) whether 
the owner of the young slave (an dominus servuli) would have been 
able to bring action based on lex Aquilia against the person who 
made him fall over (lege Aquilia cuius impulsi deciderat, agere potest). 
He answered that he could not (respondi non posse) because it was 
due to chance and not fault (cum casu magius quam culpa videretur 
factum). In this case we are not dealing with a problem of causality, 
but rather of fault. If there is fault (or even malice), legis Aquilia de 
damno iniuria dato can be exercised, while in its absence (casus or vis 
maior) the actor that involuntarily causes damage would not be 
liable.  
 
 
Applying this to current law, article 1902 of the Spanish Civil Code, 
which regulates extra-contractual liability (or Aquilian liability, in 
reference to this law) it can be observed that: “Anyone who, by 
action or omission, causes damage to another through fault or 
negligence will be required to repair that damage”, which is a 
generic and abstract regulation, typical of closed legal systems. 
However, if we take the viewpoint in the two texts by Alfenus (there 
is no doubt that here we have a case!) we find ourselves with some 
of the same elements being reiterated. For instance: iniuria, culpa and 
damnum and, obviously, a necessary cause and effect relationship 
between the action, or omission, and the damage. In the first 
fragment that we discussed, D. 92.52 pr, special focus is given to the 
causality relationship and the possible causes that could interrupt 
the customary sequence. In the second, D. 9.2.52.4, focus is placed 
on the exclusion of liability through casus (a contrario, at least 
through culpa, its requirement), and in both of them, the 
corresponding damnum and iniuria (in their simplest terminological 
sense: not in accordance with law). 
 
 
ALFENUS tells us of a real event involving the death of a slave, but 
we should point out that neither the name nor the description and 
circumstances of the slave are given, which distances us from the 
specific case. A generic reference is also not used, as might be the 
usual scenario of the slave Stichus. These elements represent two 
steps in relation to the abstract, which bring us closer to the legal 
regulation, the general and abstract characteristics of which have to 
be borne in mind. In the scenario to which Alfenus refers, 
CANNATA52satirises that it would be easy to imagine the real death 
of a young slave, called Erotus, with golden hair. He continues 
hypothesising that Erotus’ injuries were caused by Tullius, a 
treacherous baker, the previous week. All of this being true, the only 
aspect of interest is “the death of a slave as a consequence of 
injuries”: Si ex plagis servus mortuus esset. This is not so far from a 
real event subsumed in a regulation, which is not a novelty, if for 
example, we remember the XII Tables, IV, 5, telling us Si intestato 
moritur…. The first case of Alfenus is fulfilled by presenting the 
logical structure of a hypothetical rule, since it is as valid to say “If 
one dies intestate…” as “One who dies intestate…” or, in the case of 
Alfenus “If a slave dies as a result of the injuries caused by a third 
party…” as “When a slave dies as a result of the injuries…”.   
 
 
Once again, we have criticised the radicalism of the 
counterpropositions and attempted to defend the intermediary 
                                                 
52
 CANNATA, Historia, cit., p. 53. 
stance, which, in our opinion, is reflected in the digestorum libri and 
their legacy.  
 
 
